Tuesday, June 15, 2010

Short thoughts for a Tuesday

1) An article in the New York Times from June 14, 2010 provides evidence that BP did willingly cut corners in their rush to get the Deepwater Horizon well completed. This backs up what I tried to prove in my previous posts. The article lists several things that BP did to save time and money and compromise safety to get the well completed on time. According to the article the well was already behind schedule and in March they had applied for a bypass whereby a well is drilled around a problem area. By the day of the blowout, April 20th, the rig which was leased from Transocean at one half a million dollars a day plus contracting fees, was 43 days late for its next drilling operation. It would seem that it was this delay that led to a series of hasty and fatal decisions that resulted in the blowout whose effects we are still trying to get a handle on. One of the bad decisions was to use what is called a tapered string casing design which costs about 7-10 million dollars less than other methods but offers less protection if the cementing job is poor and gas were to rise up the well. Casing refers to the pipe that is assembled and then inserted into a recently drilled borehole and then held in place by cement. It helps to perform a variety of functions that facilitates the drilling operation. Although using this method saved BP money it also meant that the well had only two barriers to an upward gas flow that could cause a blowout. One was cement near the bottom of the well and a steel assembly near the top. Unfortunately the company made bad decisions regarding cementing. In regards to the cementing, BP used fewer centralizers, devices that make sure that the final string of casing is centered in the well hole and ensures that cement flows evenly around the casing. BP used only six instead of the twenty one that were recommended by the cement contractor Haliburton (yep! Those guys!). Haliburton had warned BP of severe gas flow problems. According to the article on April 16th in an internal e-mail a BP official complained that it would take 10 hours to do this and he didn't like this. In addition it turns out that BP did not fully circulate heavy drilling mud through the well , because that would have taken an additional 12 hours, before they started the cement job. The American Petroleum Institute recommends full circulation to reduce the possibility that the mud will contaminate the cement and contribute to failure. BP also failed to order a cement band log, which is a testing procedure that would have evaluated the quality of the cement barrier which had already been shown by computer model run by BP to be of poor quality. A company called Schlumberger was tasked with this job but on the morning of the blowout the projected test was cancelled and the Schlumberger employees were sent home. The test would have taken an additional 12 hours. You can read the Times article here: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/15/science/earth/15rig.html?hp


2) I wrote in one of my previous posts on this Gulf oil blowout that this story would have legs. I didn't know it would have this many! From the LA Times comes this story that goes into some detail about how companies get around US safety inspections by registering these off shore rigs, which are considered ships under international law, with foreign countries whose safety and maintenance rules are easily circumvented or nonexistent. It turns out that the Deepwater Horizon rig is registered to that bastion of tough environmental and occupational safety inspections...the Marshall Islands! This is a tiny impoverished group of atolls many of which are smaller than the Deepwater rig itself! Because these rigs are classified as foreign vessels the Coast Guard will conduct a cursory inspection and rely on the safety reports that are prepared by the outside firms that are often paid directly by the owner of the vessel. Minerals and Management Service is responsible for what goes on "below the waterline" but not for what occurs on the top including staffing decisions and command structure. It is this command and staffing structure that may have helped contribute to the blowout. According to Donald Brown who has been a chief mechanic on the rig since it was built in 2000, there has been a gradual reduction of manpower over the years. This has led to dual command structure whereby on the day of the explosion an oil drilling expert made critical decisions ahead of a licensed sea captain. John Konrad, who is a licensed sea captain and who writes a maritime blog, said that oil rigs should be under the command of a licensed sea captain. It turns out that on the Deepwater Horizon the oil drilling expert made the decisions about safety. This kind of dual command system would not be permitted on a US flagged operation. Offshore rigs like the Deepwater Horizon float above the well connected by thousands of pipes and are kept in place by elaborate navigational systems hence the need for an experienced sea captain. Read the LA Times article here: http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-oil-inspection-20100615,0,7349376.story and access John Konrad's maritime blog here: http://gcaptain.com/

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