Friday, April 10, 2009

This is the best we can do in terms of "the good Taliban" ?

I have been reading reports for some time that our new strategy in Afghanistan is to isolate out of the several different factions that go under the name of the "Taliban" the one or two that are moderate and try to work with them and split them off from the more "radical" factions. I believe that Joe Biden was quoted as saying something to the effect that 70% or so are not radicals and that given the right approach we can deal with them. I find this number absurd and believe that whatever chance we had to form a political alliance of necessity went out the window a long time ago. However that seems to be the approach. In theory it is not a bad approach, however its success would depend on who or what group we choose. If this report from the Asia Times is accurate, and it is not the first time that I have read this, we really are desperate! It seems that after much deliberation the group/individual we have decided who will fit the definition of "moderate" Taliban is none other than our old friend from the 1980's Gulbidden Hekmatyar. Before we discuss the possibilities for success of this approach we must engage in a brief historical background on Mr. Hekmatyar and his times.








For those of you not old enough to remember the 1980's or just have short memories Gulbidden Hekmatyar was America's and Pakistan's go to guy during the anti-Soviet jihad that was run out of the refugee camps of Peshawar. He received the bulk of the ISI support and CIA money. How did he end up in such a privileged position? He first came to attention as a university student in Kabul during the 1970's (he was an engineering major) who was initially attracted to left wing communist ideology but later fell under the spell of the Muslim Brotherhood and became an Islamist before it was fashionable. He and his fellow radical students would pick fights with left wing student groups such as Communists and Maoists. It is also rumored that at this time he supposedly threw acid in the faces of women who did not wear the veil. While it is hard to prove or disprove this, given his sadistic violent tendencies it is credible that he did engage in this behavior. After killing a Maoist student he was jailed and then later fled to Pakistan. While there he formed a bond with the Islamist political group Jamaat-i-Islami which is the largest and oldest political Islamist party in Pakistan. Through them he also formed ties with the ISI which is the Pakistani equivalent of our CIA. While this was going on Afghanistan, which was for all intents and purposes a Soviet satellite, was refusing to recognize the Durrand line that separates Afghanistan and Pakistan and claiming the Pashtun part of Pakistan as part of Afghanistan. This naturally did not sit well with Pakistan and its leader Ali Bhutto (Benazirs daddy) so he came up with the idea of using Islamists like Hekmatyar to stir up trouble inside Afghanistan. Bhutto would not live long enough to see these efforts bear fruit because he was overthrown and then executed by his successor General Zia-al Haq, a truly awful leader whose dictatorship Pakistan is still trying to recover from. Unlike Bhutto whose alliance with the Islamists was tactical Zia was the real deal. A man who truly wanted to Islamize Pakistan. He also wanted to neutralize Afghanistan as a potential threat in the event of a war with Pakistan's real enemy India. This is the policy that goes by the term strategic depth. The Islamists like Hekmatyar could be very useful for this. There was one problem however. After the coup relations with America had sunk to an all time low. Although it did not receive a lot of press at the time right on the heels of the Iranian embassy attack our embassy in Pakistan was attacked. Calls for help from the Pakistani police and armed forces went unheeded, people died and there was a feeling that Zia deliberately withheld support. President Jimmy Carter who was being attacked domestically from all sides was under pressure to punish Pakistan and was about to do just that when a gift from heaven appeared for General Zia. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on Christmas Eve 1979 set in motion a chain of events that are still being played out to this day. However for Zia it was a godsend. In the space of a couple of hours Pakistan went from being an enemy to America's best new friend. Presidential foreign policy advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski came up with the idea of making Afghanistan the Soviets Vietnam and the way to do that would be to use Islam as a political weapon. Like Bhutto Jimmy Carter did not last long enough to see this policy bear fruit because he was tossed out of office and Republican Ronald Reagan was elected in 1980. Zia who was not noted for having a sense of humor saw which way the political winds were blowing in the United States and when Carter offered him a financial/military aid package that Zia deemed insufficient he turned it down calling it peanuts! It was probably the only humorous remark Zia ever made. Reagan upped the ante and suddenly massive amounts of aid flowed into Pakistan which was matched by Saudi Arabia. In what was to be another fateful move whose consequences we are still living with Pakistan insisted that all aid and military training be channeled through their intelligence service the ISI. Zia and the Pakistani military realized that they could use American support for their own political ends of achieving strategic depth by supporting insurgent groups that would be proxies for Pakistan. They immediately shifted all the military and financial support to groups who were radical Islamists and bypassed other opposition groups who were secular and thereby could not be controlled as easily by Pakistan. What better person to lead the charge then Gulbidden Hekmatyar. So Hekmatyer and his group called the Hezb-i-Islami received the bulk of the support from the ISI and America. His group, which did not have very strong grassroots support inside Afghanistan, was very dependant on Pakistani support, which suited Pakistan just fine. Before the anti-Soviet jihad Afghanistan was not a hotbed of radical Islamism. It was a tribal society with a more tolerant view of Islam then is the case nowadays. Because of the jihad however that was to change. The more moderate groups that supported the monarchy and King Zahir Shah and other secular democratic parties and organizations were frozen out or killed off and over time the opposition passed into the hands of the Islamists. Add to this the massive refugee population that fled into Pakistan and also Iran, which radicalized the Shiite opposition, and you had a steady stream of recruits going into fight a jihad many of whom grew up as orphans and had no knowledge of the history and customs of Afghan society. People like this were putty in the hands of Pakistan and Hekmatyer and then later the Taliban. As the jihadi groups became more and more successful bleeding the Soviets the more attention they received from the American media causing one commentator Peggy Noonan to gush that they were the equivalent of our own countries founding freedom fighters, this at a time when Hekmatyer was telling any reporter with a microphone how much he hated the West! For statements like that Peggy Noonan has become a very respected political commentator in the mainstream media. Ah, but I digress. Along with fighting the Soviets Hekmatyer's group also killed off any opposition figures that got in his way and involved himself in a big way with the opium trade, a very lucrative business for sure-all under the watchful eye of the CIA. Eventually the strategy worked and the Soviets under Mikhail Gorbachev decided to call it quits and pull out. While this satisfied the United States it did not satisfy Pakistan who were not happy at the prospect of a coalition government that would not be under their control. They wanted a government in the pocket of Pakistan and Hekmatyer was the man they wanted.













At the time the Soviets pulled out most people assumed the puppet communist government of Mohammad Najibullah would collapse but that was not the case. His government hung on to power for another three years mainly because the opposition insurgents groups could not get along with each other and develop a common strategy. When the bell finally started to toll for the Najibullah government in 1992 government officials and supporters bolted to join the opposition groups, often based on their ethnicity. This meant that the Pashtuns in the Najibullah government hooked up with Hekmatyar. As the Najibullah government started to crumble and fall apart in 1992 "the race for Kabul" was on between the various opposition factions led by Hekmatyar's Hezb-i-Islami, Burhannudin Rabbani's Jamiat-e-Islami, an opposition group composed primarily of Tajiks and Uzbeks who traditionally had their differences with the majority Pashtuns, and a faction led by the warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum. Burhanuddin's group got there first much to the chagrin of Hekmatyar who responded by raining rocket fire on a mostly defenseless civilian population. Hekmatyar deliberatly targeted civilian populations justifying this by stating that this was in response to Kabul's pro-Soviet inclinations. While all the groups bear some responsibility for the destruction of Kabul it was Hekmatyar who caused the most carnage. He continued to attack the capitol shifting alliances along the way and hooking up with the Shiite groups and Dostum for a time but never could quite wrest control from Rabbani and Massoud. Still the Rabbani government did not have total control of the country and control had decentralized into warlords and their geographical areas. America had washed its hands of Afghanistan and it had become a failed state. Different warlords and insurgent groups controlled different areas and to maintain control they needed cash. This they got through the opium trade and by stepping up the use of transit checkpoints where drivers were shaken down for cash in increasingly shorter intervals. This began to irritate the truck drivers and business interests who were increasingly looking at Afghanistan as a route to get to the newly liberated states of Central Asia. The civilian government of Pakistan at the time (Zia had been killed in a mysterious plane crash in 1988 that remains unsolved to this day) led by Benazir Bhutto wanted to open up the trade routes and the United States was also looking to gain access to the newly discovered oil and gas reserves that had been discovered in Central Asia which they wanted to transit through Afghanistan thereby bypassing Russia and Iran. Both countries were looking for a stable Afghanistan, although for different reasons. The people of Afghanistan were getting sick of all the infighting and corruption that was going on at this time too and the Pashtuns that had originally thrown their support for Hekmatyar grew alienated from the mans corruption and violence. The stage was set for someone to "take back Afghanistan" and bring back truth justice and the Pashtun way. That someone would be a group of mostly madrassa students and former mujaheddin commanders that would come to be known as the Taliban.









The origins of the Taliban have become enshrouded in legend and myth over time. The legend goes something like this. As the area around Kandahar descended into chaos and anarchy with warlords and militias controlling certain areas and making life hell for the traders of Kandahar and the "trucking mafia" to transit their goods through while at the same time crimes against the civilian population including shakedowns, rape and sodomy were becoming more and more frequent, a group of tribal chiefs and ulema from the local and Pakistani madrassas grew more disenchanted with this state of affairs and resolved to do something about it. As the story goes in response to the abduction and rape of a couple of teenage girls one of the ulema who had started to mobilize the local Pashtun population to take back Kandahar and then Afghanistan, Mullah Omar, led a group of madrassa students who would come to be called the Taliban (talib means seeker of religious knowledge or student) to avenge the crime. They attacked the camp where the girls were held, freed them and then hanged the commander from a tank for all to see. Similar interventions followed and soon Mullah Omar and his group came to be seen as modern day Islamic Robin Hoods. They started to pick up more Pashtun support. At the same time Pakistan was beginning to have second thoughts about their support for Gulbidden Hekmatyar. For all the money and military support they had given him they did not have much to show for it. Not only had he not taken control of the country but he was increasingly alienating the Pashtuns who should have been his natural allies. Pakistan had a choice to make. Either they could give in to a coalition government in Kabul that would include groups that would not be under their control or they could find an alternative to Hekmatyar. What made the Taliban option attractive to Benazir Bhutto and interior minister Naseerullah Babar was that not only were the Taliban Pashtuns but many of the madrassas that their followers came from were organized by another Pakistani Islamist party, the Jamiat-e-Islami (JUI) led by Maulana Fazlur Rehman, that had formed an alliance with the government of Bhutto. Pakistan at this time was desperate to open up the trade routes to Central Asia and while the easist route would have been through Kabul to Mazar-e-Sharif and then up into Uzbekistan because of the violent fighting between the insurgent groups and their warlord followers these routes could not be secured. An alternative would be to use the southern route from Quetta through Kandahar on to Herat and then up into Turkmenistan. To do this they would have to clear out the bandits and eliminate all the checkpoints that were bleeding the drivers pockets. In short what they needed was a good old dose of law and order. This the Taliban was ready to provide with a strong dose of conservative Islam thrown into the mix. The first real hint that there was a new sherrif in town was a daring raid on a weapons depot located in the border town of Spin Boldak that was under the control of Hekmatyar in the fall of 1994. The success of this attack stunned Hekmatyar and the warlords in the area. It was widely assumed that a ragtag group of ulema and madrassa students could not have done this on their own and that the group was recieving Pakistani support. From this point on the Taliban picked up more supporters and the momentum was on their side. More Pashtuns flocked to the movement and away from Hekmatyar. Why did the Kandahari Pashtun switch to the Taliban and dump fellow Pashtun Hekmatyar? Because despite all the support that Hekmatyar recieved he never really related or identified with the rural and tribal Pashtun customs of southern Afghanistan. He was seen as an urban educated elitist who had no regard for tribal customs and as someone who wanted to centralize authority in his hands and take it away from the local jirgas and tribal leaders that had previously excersized power. Factor in his cruel violent and corrupt behavior and one can easily see why the Taliban rolled up victory upon victory. For the Taliban were what they said they were. They were honest, they were religious and they did bring law and order. After over a decade of lawlessness and insecurity this was a welcome relief to the people of Kandahar who could put up with the radical Islamism that went along with the Taliban. As the Taliban rolled up more territory Hekmatyar began to feel himself squeezed. He tried to get back in the good graces of the Rabbani government and took a post but he had waited too long and by now nothing was going to stop the Taliban from taking control of Kabul which they did in 1996. Hekmatyar realizing the game was up fled to Iran for political asylum where the Iranian intelligence services kept a close eye on him. Here he stayed until the attacks of 9/11. After that attack the Iranian government expelled him from Iran. Why did they do that? No one knows for sure and various theories have been put forth. At any rate Gulbidden was back. The question was what was his next move? Join the newly installed government led by the Northern Alliance, many of whom he had just spent the last decade fighting or go back into opposition. The Iranians had supposedly taken all his assets and it did not look like he had much of a base left. What is a former jihadi to do?







Not only did Gulbidden have a choice to make but so did Pakistan. While they paid lip service to Bush's war on terror they had a dilema on their hands. Like Hekmatyar they did not look favorably to the prospect of the Northern Alliance holding power in Afghanistan. Both India and Iran had substantial influence with the Northern Alliance having helped fund it for some time and this did not bode well for the policy of strategic depth. However the fall of the Taliban did present an opportunity for Musharraf, who had seized power from Nawaz Sharif in a coup in 1999, who would receive substantial military and economic aid from the Bush administration in return for Pakistani support in the "war on terror'. The trick for Pakistan was to use this support to nurture some group that would oppose the Northern Alliance and support Pakistani interests and at the same time go after Al-Queda who consisted of Arabs and other foreigners that Pakistan had little use for. That is what happened as Pakistan made several high level Al-Queda arrests while at the same time giving shelter to Mullah Omar in Quetta and other Taliban leaders in the tribal territories who may become useful later on. As for Hekmatyar as he made his way back into Afghanistan he carried a multi million price tag on his head. In fact a Hellfire missile was fired on him and missed its target. It was the first targeted assassination attempt against someone not immediately implicated in 9/11 by the Bush administration. Hekmatyar made the decision to fight against the Karzai government and scored a few successes in this endeavour. The fact that as of today this man is still alive even with all the enemies that he has made over the years leads one to believe that some very powerful groups are looking out for him, specifically Pakistani intelligence services. No doubt there are some elements in the ISI who think that he may still have some value. Certainly Karzai over the years has tried to reach out to him only to be rebuffed every time with the rejoinder that only when all foreign forces are gone will Hekmatyar talk. Karzai knows that the Taliban of Mullah Omar and the other factions of the neo-taliban have significant differences with Hekmatyar and no doubt hope that Hekmatyar can be used to help the Karzai government destroy the movement. However forming a coalition with someone who has never in his life shown any willingness to be a good coalition partner is not an easy thing to pull off. As the security situation in Afghanistan deteriorated the need to find someone to deal with who might be able to draw support from the Pashtuns and away from the Taliban became more pressing. With the election of Barack Obama who has made the Af-Pak theater of war his most important foreign policy issue the need to find allies from among the insurgents is critical otherwise it will be just about impossible to stabilize Afghanistan. Despite Biden's claims of 70% "good Taliban" who are just waiting for the right offer to switch sides the situation is grim. There are not 70% and increasingly if Obama is serious about escalating this war the only option seems to be Gulbidden. After much soul searching this is the guy who will represent the "moderate Taliban"! Will this work?







This long detour into the historical background of Gulbidden Hekmatyar and his times is neccessary to try to understand where we are today. If the Obama administration truly believes that Hekmatyar is the best resource we have to try to draw the Pashtuns away from the insurgency and split the movement then it shows how bad this situation has become. It might also explain the reason why Hekmatyar is still alive despite the high ransom he carries. He obviously is useful to somebody. The Saudis who have been trying to affect a reconciliation between the Taliban and the Karzai government have spoken to representatives of Hekmatyar to get him on board. For his part Hekmatyar refuses to be brought in unless all foreign forces leave and he continues to attack occupation forces, In his old age he has become a born again democrat who believes in elections along with Islamic government. Whether his commitment to democracy is real or just a ploy to try to get back in the good graces of Afghans who tired of his act a long time ago I will leave to the reader to decide. The question before the court is this. Can this strategy work? No it cannot. Hekmatyar is not getting any younger. He is now in his sixties and time has passed him by. The various groups that go under the name of the Taliban, both Mullah Omar's group and the other groups that are called the neo-Taliban, have no use for Hekmatyar. He is a symbol of the past. He does not command popular support and the waves of Islamic students that the Taliban draws on come from schools that are led by the JUI that are allied with Omar and the neo-Taliban and are no freinds of Hekmatyar. Hekmatyar would end up being supported by foreign intelligence services like the ISI and the CIA just like in the 1980's. This would only cause more resentment among the Pashtun rank and file but without that it would be just about impossible for this strategy to work. As for the coalition partners who would have to "welcome" Gulbidden back I doubt the welcome mat is being rolled out. I am sure the idea of having to deal with him again would make them very uneasy. It sure would me. So if this is a bad idea then what should the Obama administration do? Sadly there are no good options here. But escalating this war into Pakistan is about as bad an idea as you can come up with. The "Taliban" will always be with us whether people like it or not because: a) they are useful to Pakistan in their conflict with India and b) they command popular support, like it or not, with the Pashtun population of Afghanistan which is the majority ethnic group in Afghanistan. Until someone comes up with a way to solve the issue of Kashmir to the satisfaction of both India and Pakistan (and to the Kashmiri's!) Afghanistan will always be a proxy battleground for India and especially Pakistan. If the goal is to eliminate Al-Queda the way to do it is co-operation between police and intelligence agencies of the states involved oin this conflict. As for the Taliban we will have to deal with them one way or another by letting them participate in the government even though this strategy carries risks. Perhaps some regional autonomy for the Pashtun areas might be offered. I don't really know. I do know that if Richard Holbrooke and Hillary Clinton really believe that the goal is to bring Afghanistan kicking and screaming into the 21st century they will fail like all the other empires before them. In the process they might blow up Pakistan and the consequences would be horrific. The endgame here may be to "tolerate" a degree of insurgency by the Taliban in exchange for the stabilty of Pakistan and hope that over time Afghanistan works itself out. That is a tall order to be sure but escalating this war with no real strategy for success is a quagmire of major proportions. Trying to hook up with Gulbidden Hekmatyar is not a good place to start.

The Asia Times article is here:http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/KD10Ak04.html For some background on Hekmatyar this is a good place to start from Peter Lee who writes the China Hand blog which is one of the most informative blogs written today concerning foreign policy issues. http://www.counterpunch.org/lee03092009.html

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